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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78A-3-102(3)(A). 
ISSUES 
1. Was the coverage question "fairly debatable" as a matter of law? This 
issue was presented and fairly included in the first question presented for review 
in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
Standard of Review: "On certiorari, we review the court of appeals' 
decision for correctness." 1 "The correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns 
on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's decision under the 
appropriate standard of review."2 "Summary judgment is appropriate when 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law .... Whether an insured's claim is fairly debatable 
under a given set of facts is also a question of law. However, ... the fairly-debatable 
defense should not be resolved through summary judg1nent if reasonable minds 
could differ as to whether the defendant's conduct measures up to the standard 
1 Utah v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, ~[ 7, 106 P.3d 729 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
2 State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, 'Il 7, 95 P.3d 276 (citing Newspaper Agency 
Corp. v. Auditing Div., 938 P.2d 266, 267 (Utah 1997)). 
1 
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required for insurance claim investigations .... Furthermore, summary judgment 
should be granted only when it clearly appears that there is no reasonable 
probability that the party n1oved against could prevail."3 
2. Were there genuine issues regarding the reasonableness of the 
insurer's conduct in this case? This issue was presented and fairly included in the 
second question presented for review in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
Standard of Review: "We begin with the well-recognized statement that in 
a summary judgment proceeding, all facts and the reasonable inferences to be 
made therefrom should be construed in a light favorable to the non-moving party. 
In some cases, the parties may agree on the objective statement of the facts, but 
may fundamentally disagree on the reasonable inferences to be made from those 
facts .... Even if the moving party's objective statement of the facts [is] agreed 
upon, reasonable inferences made from those undisputed facts can indeed create 
a genuine issue of material fact." 4 
3 Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 2012 UT 52, 1{<j{ 1, 6, 8, 286 P.3d 301 
(internal quotations, citations omitted). 
4 USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2010 UT 31, 1I 33, 235 P.3d 749 (citation 
omitted). 
2 
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3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Oltmanns Rule 
56(£) relief? This issue was fairly included in the second question presented for 
review in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
Standard of Review: "We review the denial of a rule 56(f) motion for an 
abuse of discretion. We will not reverse the district court's decision to grant or 
deny a rule 56(f) n1otion for discovery unless it exceeds the limits of 
reasona bi Ii ty. "5 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
UTAH R. CIV. PROC. 56(c), (E)-(F) (Addendum 1 hereto). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Courts 
Below. 
1. Declaratory Judgment Action 
Brady Blackner was seriously injured while being towed by a Honda 
AquaTrax that was operated by his cousin-in-law, Robert Allen Oltmanns. (R. 2, 
14). Blackner filed action for personal injuries against Oltmanns, and others, in 
5 Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 2008 UT 55, <JI 20, 192 P.3d 
858 (internal quotation, citations omitted). 
3 
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Farmington District Court. (R. 2, <f!S). At the time, Oltmanns and his wife were 
insured by Fire Insurance Exchange under a policy of homeowner' s insurance. (R. 
2, <jl6). Oltmanns tendered defense of the action to Fire Insurance. (R. 2, <JI7). 
Fire Insurance did not accept the tender. Instead, it filed this action for 
declaratory judgment taking the position that there was no coverage. (R. 3, 1(10). 
In the meantime, Fire Insurance asked counsel to continue representing Oltmanns 
at his own expense. (R. 558). 
Before discovery was taken, Fire Insurance moved for summary judgment. 
(R. 29). The motion was filed on the basis of the following exclusion: 
We do not cover bodily injury, ... which 
7. results from the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or 
unloading of: ... 
c. jet skis and jet sleds6 or 
d. any other watercraft owned or rented to an insured and 
which: (1) has more than 50 horsepower inboard or 
inboard-outdrive motor power; .... (RR. 598-99) 
(emphasis in original). 
6 No one argued that the Honda AquaTrax was a "jet sled." Fire Ins. 
Exchnnge v. Olt-nzanns, 2012 UT App 230, 1[ 10 n.3, 285 P.3d 802. 
4 
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There was no disputing that the Honda AquaTrax was a sit-down version 
of a personal watercraft with an inboard "135-horsepower. .. engine." (RR. 44-45). 
However, it was neither owned by, nor rented to, Oltmanns. (R. 6, <j{4). Therefore, 
Subparagraph (d) was inapplicable. Rather, Fire Insurance contended that the 
Aqua Trax was a "jet ski," and subject to the exclusion in Subparagraph ( c). 
Fire Insurance claimed that Subparagraph (c) applied to "any jet ski." (R. 
32). Specifically, it contended that Jet Ski had become "a genericized term for any 
type of personal watercraft." (R. 34, <:1(9). The insurer found support for this in 
Wikipedia. (R. 57). However, the same entry also noted that "Jet Ski is the brand 
name of personal watercraft (PWC) manufachued by Kawasaki Heavy 
Industries." (emphasis in original). This was not all: "Jet Ski ... can also refer to 
versions of PWCs with pivoting handlepoles known as 'stand-ups."' 
Fire Insurance's Wikipedia authority stressed this latter definition: "'Jet Ski' 
became foremost the colloquial term for stand-up personal watercraft, because in 
1973 Kawasaki was responsible for a limited production of stand-up models .... " 
(R. 57) (emphasis added). This was followed by a table showing that the Jet Ski 
trademark was generic for "Stand-up personal watercraft." (R. 62). 
5 
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Fire Insurance settled on the one - and only - definition that supported its 
claim and contended that the policy "clearly and unambiguously excludes 
coverage for any jet ski, and not just the 'Jet Ski®' brand .... " (R. 32). It dismissed 
Subparagraph (d), which had application to all makes and models of watercraft, 
with the argument that it did not contain the word "personal." (R. 178). Summary 
judgment was granted on these bases. (R. 181). 
Oltmanns and Blackner appealed (Case No. 20100462-CA). The appeal was 
decided on August 16, 2012. Fire Ins. Exchange v. Oltmanns, 2012 UT App 230, 285 
P.3d 802. The court ruled that Subparagraph 7(c) was "ambiguous as a matter of 
law." Id., at c_J{ 10. Based on Wikipedia, "at least one additional interpretation [of 
jet ski] is entirely possible." Id., at 'I[ 9. "Did [the insurer] mean all manner of 
personal watercraft? Or did it mean only the stand-up variety?" Id., at 1[ 10. 
"Because the exclusionary provision is ambiguous, it must be construed 
against the drafter, and thus the language relied on by the insurance company is 
not effective to exclude coverage for an insured's accident resulting from use of 
an AquaTrax personal watercraft of the sit-down variety." Id., at~[ 11. The 
6 
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judgment of the district court was reversed and the case "remanded for trial or 
such other proceedings as 1nay now be in order." Id. 
Fire Insurance proceeded to settle the Blackner case. (R. 228, 'Ill 4). It, also, 
reimbursed Oltmanns for his fees defending the Blackner case. (Id., at 'IllS). 
However, Fire Insurance "refused, despite demand, to pay Defendant Oltmanns 
for his attorney's fees prosecuting this coverage action and the successful 
appeal."(ld., at 116). 
2. Counterclaim for Breach of the Implied Covenant 
On January 9, 2013, Oltmanns filed a Counterclaim for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. 226). Specifically, he alleged 
that Fire Insurance "did not fairly evaluate the [Blackner] claim, and unreasonably 
rejected it, .... " (R. 228, 'Il21).7 The claim was for "attorney's fees for prosecuting 
this coverage action and the successful appeal." (Id., at <j{22). 
On January 24, 2013, Oltmanns filed a First Amended Counterclaim (R. 244) 
adding a claim for breach of the insurance contract. (R. 246). Leave to file the First 
7 See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). 
7 
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Amended Counterclaim was granted. (R. 309). Fire Insurance's response was a 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (R. 352), which was denied. (R. 398). 
As part of the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings (R. 398), Oltmanns was required to make a more definite statement of 
his counterclaim, which he did in the Second Amended Counterclaim filed on 
September 30, 2013. (R. 403). The parties proceeded to discovery, which included 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents. (RR. 458, 464, 484). 
On May 30, 2014, Fire Insurance moved, a second time, for summary 
judgment. (R. 494). The motion was based, in principal part, on the Affidavit of 
Shawn L. Stephens (R. 537), Litigation Claims Specialist for Fire Insurance. (Id., at 
<j{2). Stephens is the one who investigated the Blackner claim. (R. 538, '1(3). 8 
Stephens secured the basic pleadings in the Blackner case, a copy of the 
Rental Agreement, and Oltmanns' deposition. (RR. 538-39, <jf9). After meeting 
8 Stephens originally characterized his investigation as "thorough." (R. 
538, <JI8). Objection was made that this was "conclusory" since there was nothing 
to indicate what was a "thorough" coverage investigation. (RR. 665-66, CJI18). 
Accordingly, the characterization was withdrawn. (R. 867, <JI18) (Addendum 3 
hereto). Howe·ver, the characterization continued to appear in Fire Insurance's 
pleadings. (R. 738). 
8 
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with his supervisors, the decision was made "to send this matter to outside 
counsel for a coverage opinion." (R. 539, <]ll 1 ). Other than a request for the vehicle 
registration (R. 558), which was never received, this was the sum total of the 
factual investigation. 
The coverage letter (R. 560) (Addendum 5 hereto) was simply filed with the 
exhibits to the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 
518). There was nothing authenticating the physical exhibit. Stephens was the 
source for the factual statement in the Memorandum in Support (R. 503, 1{23), but 
all he said was: "I received the coverage opinion .... " (R. 540, '1[14) (emphasis 
added). 
To be clear, an affidavit of coverage counsel was not included. As a result, 
Stephens is the one who published the contents of the letter: "Based on his 
research regarding the term 'jet-ski/ [ counsel] believed that we had a 75% chance 
in prevailing in a declaratory relief action." (R. 540, ci[14). 
However, Oltmanns did not object on the basis of authentication: "The 
statement [1123, State1nent of Undisputed Facts] is inadmissible, and conclusory, 
hearsay. It is based on the Affidavit of Shawn L. Stephens. (Exhibit D). However, 
9 
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he was not the author of counsel's letter (Exhibit K), and there is no affidavit from 
counsel. As a result, there is no support for the statement, other than counsel's 
letter, .... " (R. 666, CJ{23) ( emphasis added). 
In its Reply Memorandum, Fire Insurance confused the authentication 
requirements ,,vith the hearsay rule: "The statement is based off of Shawn 
Stephens understanding of the coverage opinion .... Thus, the statement is not 
hearsay as it is based on the first hand knowledge and understanding of Shawn 
Stephens." (R. 732, 123). 
At the summary judgment hearing, Fire Insurance changed tack and 
argued that the letter was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. UTAH R. 
Evm. 801(c)(2). This was the basis for the trial court's ruling: 
[T]his Court finds that statement ["Fire Insurance had a 75% chance 
in prevailing in a declaratory relief action"] is based upon the 
underst,,nding of Shawn Stephens for Fire Insurance, as set forth in 
his affidavit. The Court concludes that the statement of fact is not 
hearsay because receiving the coverage opinion from coverage 
counsel, ... was part of the process of investigating the facts of the 
accident and fairly evaluating the claim. 
R. 868, <jl23 (Addendum 3 hereto). 
10 
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As a result, Fire Insurance certified the reasonableness of its own conduct. 
It is not hard to see why this ruling was made, particularly, when Fire Insurance 
argued before the trial court that "the conduct and analysis of coverage 
counsel. . .is not at issue." (R. 737, <_ll2) ( emphasis added). 
According to Fire Insurance, the quality of the coverage opinion did not 
matter. It was enough that Fire Insurance had a coverage opinion justifying the 
filing of an action for declaratory judgment. And yet, Fire Insurance continued to 
assert the "75% chance of prevailing in a declaratory relief action" (R. 567). At the 
same time denying that the basis for the opinion was relevant. 
Fire InsErance's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on September 
24, 2014. The Order Granting Summary Judgment was entered on October 10, 
2014. (R. 863) (Addendum 3 hereto). Appeal was filed on October 20, 2014. (R. 
876) (Appellate Case No. 20140984-CA). 
The order was affirmed on appeal. Fire Ins. Exchange v. Oltmanns, 2016 UT 
App 54, <_II 16, 370 P.3d 566 (Addendum 2 hereto). This judgment is the subject of 
the present appeal. 
11 
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B. Statement of Facts 
Very few facts were relevant to the coverage decision. Therefore, most of 
the Statement of Undisputed Facts (R. 499) was immaterial. Oltmanns 
controverted those few statements he deemed material. For example, <j{18: "Fire 
Insurance began a thorough coverage investigation and evaluation regarding the accident 
in lulu of 2006 that involved Oltmanns." (R. 502). 
As noted above (pg. 8 n.8), Oltmanns argued this was "nothing but a 
conclusion that is unsupported by the facts." (R. 665, <J{18). There was nothing to 
indicate what would be a "thorough coverage investigation." Accordingly, Fire 
Insurance withdrew the characterization, and this was accepted by the trial court. 
(R. 867, '1118) (Addendum 3 hereto).9 
Fire Insurance was content to leave the matter as follows: "Fire Insurance 
conducted an investigation and followed the necessary steps required by Fire 
Insurance Exchange." (R. 731, <_[18). This, of course, was entirely different. There 
was no disputing that Fire Insurance conducted some kind of investigation. 
9 Though, as we stated above (pg. 8 n.8), it continued to appear in the 
pleadings. (R. 738). 
12 
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Even so, Fire Insurance felt the need to re-characterize the testimony of its 
witness (Shawn Stephens): 
• When a claim is made under a policy of insurance issued by Fire 
Insurance Exchange, we conduct an investigation. 
• As part of this investigation, the initial step is to ensure the 
applicable insurance policy was in effect at the time the loss 
occurred. 
• Thereafter, we review the insuring agreement and the definitions 
contained in the insurance policy. 
• A review of the exclusions and conditions and their relation to the 
loss is then done to determine if the loss is a covered occurrence 
and to determine if the person seeking coverage qualifies as an 
insured. 
• If we have a coverage question regarding the language of an 
insuring agreement, we often refer the matter to outside counsel 
to provide a coverage opinion. We rely on outside counsel to 
assist in making a coverage determination. 
• Fire Insurance Exchange followed this process when we 
conducted an investigation relating to the accident that occurred 
that is the subject of this matter. 
RR. 730-31, <jf18. 
Most of this was not at issue. For example, there was no question that Fire 
Insurance relied, principally (if not exclusively) on the opinion of outside counsel. 
13 
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In fact, what appears to have been most significant was counsel's statement of "a 
75% chance in prevailing in a declaratory relief action." (R. 540, CJ[l4). 
However, there was one glaring omission. In the" Analysis of Coverage," 
there was no mention of "defense." There was never any explanation for Fire 
Insurance's failure to assume the defense of the Blackner action even though the 
tender was plainly acknowledged. (R. 561) (Addendum 5 hereto). 
Counsel, also, acknowledged: "Under Utah law, a liability insurance 
carrier's duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify." (R. 565). However, 
counsel merely recommended the filing of a declaratory judgment action. (R. 567) 
(Addendum 5 hereto): "It would be dangerous to simply deny coverage because 
Ivlr. Blackner and Mr. Oltmanns may enter into an agreen1ent to stipulate to a 
large judgment and Mr. Oltmanns could then assign his claims against Fire 
Insurance [E]xchange to Ivlr. Blackner." (Id.) 
However, counsel never advised against assuming the defense of the 
Blackner action. Fire Insurance made this decision, entirely, on its own. Fire 
Insurance has argued - repeatedly - that it did not reject the tender. However, it 
14 
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never assumed the defense; not, at least, until after ruling by the Court of 
Appeals. For this, Fire Insurance got no protection from the coverage opinion. 
Fire Insurance, basically, acknowledged this: "[T[he coverage opinion is 
relevant only to the issue of Fire Insurance's decision to file a declaratory 
judgment action, not its ultimate success or failure." (RR. 739-40) (emphasis 
added). Evidently, Fire Insurance did not consider that it could file for declaratory 
judgment and provide a defense for Oltmanns - at the same time. 
There was more to Oltmann' s objection (R. 666): "Further, there is evidence 
that Plaintiff's investigation was less than 'thorough.' See Statement of Additional 
Facts, <I[l." Statement of Additional Facts No. 1 was as follows: 
Before sending the claim for a coverage evaluation, [Fire Insurance] 
determined that it needed "a copy of the vehicle title and registration 
at the time of the accident to determine how the jetski [sic] is 
classified." [Fire Insurance] wanted to know if the vehicle were 
classified as a "watercraft." [Fire Insurance] thought this may "affect 
coverage as per the terms of the insured's policy." [Fire Insurance] 
conceded: "This information is needed before sending out for 
coverage opinion [sic]." However, the vehicle title and registration 
were not secured. Fire Insurance Exchange' s Answer to Interrogatory 
No. 1 (Exhibit 1 hereto). It is clear that Utah titles and registers 
"personal watercraft." Utah Code Ann.§ 73-18-2(16); Vessel 
Application for Utah Title (TC-656V). 
RR. 667-68, 111. 
15 
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As previously noted (pg. 9), this is what remained of Fire Insurance's 
investigation, which it never completed: 
Fire Insurance Exchange did not need said information prior to 
sending the matter out for a coverage opinion .... It was determined 
that the identified information would be helpful, but it was not felt to 
be critical. If coverage counsel felt the information was essential for a 
coverage opinion, additional efforts to obtain said information 
would have been made. 
R. 735. 
Even though Fire Insurance admitted that the vehicle registration may 
"affect coverage as per the terms of the insured's policy," and the information 
was "needed before sending out for coverage opinion," the trial court deemed it 
to be of no significance. Therefore, ~[18 was declared to be "undisputed." (R. 867, 
<j{l8) (Addendum 3 hereto). 
Oltmanns, also, controverted <fi23: "Bnsed on {counsel's 1 research regarding the 
term "jet-ski," {hel believed thnt Fire Insurance had a 75% chance in prevailing in a 
declaratory reli~faction." (R. 666, 1[23). As noted above (pg. 9), Oltmanns objected 
that the statement was inadmissible hearsay: "It is based on the Affidavit of 
Shawn L. Stephens. (Exhibit D). However, he was not the author of counsel's 
16 
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letter (Exhibit K), and there is no affidavit from counsel. As a result, there is no 
support for the statement, other than counsel's letter, .... " (Id.) 
Fire Insurance's response showed a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
hearsay rule: "The statement is based off of Shawn Stephens understanding of the 
coverage opinion sent to him .... Thus, the statement is not hearsay as it is based on 
the first hand knowledge and understanding of Shawn Stephens." (R. 732, <jJ:23). 
We have seen how Fire Insurance avoided objection with this argument: 
Fire Insurance responded that the statement was not offered for "the 
truth of the matter asserted." UTAH R. Ev10. 801(c)(2). However, this 
Court finds that statement is based upon the understanding of 
Shawn Stephens for Fire Insurance, as set forth in his affidavit. The 
Court concludes that the statement of fact is not hearsay because 
receiving the coverage opinion from coverage counsel, ... was part of 
the process of investigating the facts of the accident and fairly 
evaluating the claim. Thus, Oltmanns' response creates no genuine 
issue of material fact. As a result, this Court concludes that this 
statement of fact is undisputed. 
R. 868, <]I23 (Addendun1 3 hereto). 
It is not hard to see why the trial court made this decision; particularly, 
when Fire Insurance argued that "the conduct and analysis of coverage 
counsel. .. is not at issue." (R. 737, 1(2). 
However, as before, there was more to the response: 
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[C]ounsel does not explain the "75%" coverage evaluation in his 
letter. It appears to have been based on nothing but dictum from the 
Florida case on which counsel, apparently, relied. In fact, there is no 
way to reconcile the coverage evaluation with the actual ruling of the 
Florida case. Further, there is no way to know whether - and if so, to 
what extent - counsel applied the Utah rule of strict construction of 
insurance policy exclusions. It does not appear that counsel 
considered how his Wikipedia search of outside sources suggested 
that the policy exclusion was ambiguous. It is certain he did not 
consider how the "watercraft" exclusion in the policy pointed to a 
narrower construction of the jet skis exclusion .... [I]f the Court is 
inclined to grant the motion, Defendant OLTMANNS should be 
granted leave to depose [coverage] counsel. See Declaration of 
Donald L. Dalton, Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(£) (submitted herewith) 
[Addendum 4 hereto]. See also Statement of Additional Facts, <j[2. 
R. 666, 1123. 
If the opinion was admitted, there were inferences that needed to be drawn 
from the "vague and conclusory nature of counsel's coverage letter." (R. 668, <_ff2). 
These were detailed in Statement of Additional Facts No. 2: 
• Counsel's opinion was based on dictum, not on the achtal ruling of 
the Florida case. 
• Counsel did not credit that the supposedly "generic" definition of 
jet ski was an inadequate basis for ruling in the Florida case. 
• Counsel did not credit that what made the policy exclusion 
"unambiguous" was the addition of the language: "jet ski or 
similar type of craft." 
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• Counsel did not consider what the absence of that language, in 
this case, meant to the construction of the policy exclusion. 
• At least, counsel attached undue significance to the dictum from 
the Florida case; and did not give sufficient weight to the 
difference in the policies considered in light of the Utah standard 
of strict construction of insurance policy exclusions. 
• Counsel did not consider how his resort to extrinsic evidence 
(Wikipedia search) suggested that jet ski was susceptible to 
different interpretations. 
• Counsel gave no heed to the "watercraft" exclusion in the policy, 
which suggested a narrower construction of jet skis. (Exhibit L, pg. 
16, <j{7(d) [R. 599]). 
RR. 668-69, 'i[2. 
Oltmanns was taking no chances with summary judgment. Even though 
Fire Insurance failed to secure an affidavit of counsel, Oltmanns filed a 
declaration of his counsel- plainly labeled under UTAH R. CIV. PROC. 56(F)-
arguing that coverage counsel's deposition should be taken. (R. 682) (Addendum 
4 hereto ). 10 
10 At the hearing, Oltmanns, also, argued (to no effect) under UTAH R. 
CIV. PROC. 56(E). 
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Fire Insurance moved to strike the declaration. (R. 764). However, the trial 
court waved it away concluding that it did not raise any genuine issues. 
Therefore, the motion was denied for being "moot." (R. 872). 
Again, the trial court concluded that none of this raised any genuine issues. 
Accordingly, 123 was "undisputed." (R. 868, <]123) (Addendum 3 hereto). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. There was no good basis for filing the declaratory judgment action. It 
was evident from the authority on which Fire Insurance relied (Wikipedia) that 
"jet ski" had multiple definitions - only one of which supported the position it 
took on coverage. Therefore, it came as no surprise that the Court of Appeals 
ruled (3-0) the provision was "ambiguous as a matter of law." Long-standing case 
authority, some of which was acknowledged by Fire Insurance's counsel, 
indicated that because of the ambiguity, the policy exclusion would be strictly 
construed against the insurer. There were no factual issues regarding the validity 
of the insurance claim, and legal issues - such as, ambiguousness - do not make 
for "fairly debatable" coverage questions. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred 
in affirming the decision of the trial court on summary judgment. 
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2. No matter what, Fire Insurance was not entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. There is a clear and notable distinction between facrual disputes 
regarding the validity of the underlying insurance claim and what information 
the insurance company used to deny the claim. There were no facrual disputes 
regarding the validity of the insurance claim. There were, however, significant 
disputes regarding the information Fire Insurance used to deny the claim. Mainly, 
the basis for the exaggerated prognosis of "a 75% chance of prevailing," which 
was dictum from a Florida case that was completely inapplicable to this case. 
These issues were waved away by the trial court- and affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals -with the determination that the quality of the coverage opinion had no 
bearing on the fairness of the coverage evaluation. It was enough for both of the 
courts below that Fire Insurance had a coverage opinion -no matter how flawed. 
3. Again, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court refusal to 
consider the inferences that were reasonably drawn from the "undisputed" 
statements of fact. These inferences were identified by Oltmanns and presented to 
the trial court in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment and in a 
plainly-labeled UTAH R. Crv. PROC. 56(F) declaration. Fire Insurance moved to 
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strike the declaration, but the trial court ruled that the motion was "moot." 
However, the questions raised by Oltmanns show that the "75% chance of 
prevailing" was overstated. There was a failure to account for the ambiguity that 
appeared, as a matter of law, on the face of the policy exclusion. This was 
compounded by the failure of counsel to note the law of "strict construction" that 
applies to insurance policy exclusions. It ended with counsel's reliance on a case 
that actually supported acceptance of the tender. The trial court abused its 
discretion in rejecting the Rule 56(f) declaration. Oltmanns raised genuine issues 
of material fact that precluded entry of summary judgment. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE "IET SKIS" EXCLUSION WAS AMBIGUOUS AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. THEREFORE, THE COVERAGE QUESTION WAS NOT FAIRLY 
DEBATABLE. 
In the first appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the "jet skis" 
exclusion was "ambiguous as a matter of law." 2012 UT App 230, at 110. "Even 
discounting the bizarre possibility that [the insurer] meant to refer only to one 
Kawasaki watercraft model, it still cannot be definitively said what the insurer 
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intended: .... " Id. This was because "at least one additional interpretation [ of "jet 
skis"] is entirely possible." Id., at <JI 9. 
The consequences were clear: "Because the exclusionary provision is 
ambiguous, it must be construed against the drafter, and thus the language relied 
on by the insurance company is not effective to exclude coverage for an insured' s 
accident resulting from use of an AquaTrax personal watercraft of the sit-down 
variety." Id., at <J[ 11. 
It was conceded that "the facts are not in dispute and never have been; 
instead, this case concerns a purely legal issue, i.e., whether the term 'jet ski' as 
used in Oltmanns's insurance policy was ambiguous as a matter of law." 2016 UT 
App 54, at ~I 12. As a result, the trial court ruling was reviewed "for correctness, 
according it no deference." Id., at 11 9 ( emphasis added). 
There were no factual issues regarding coverage. The policy did not define 
11jet skis," and Jet Ski® was a registered trademark of Kawasaki Heavy Industries, 
which obviously did not apply to the Honda AquaTrax. Therefore, Fire Insurance 
had to cast outside the policy for support that "jet ski" was a genericized term for 
all personal watercraft. 
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It found support for this in Wikipedia, but this was not the only definition. 
The Wikipedia entry started with the following: "Jet Ski is the brand name of 
personal watercraft (PWC) manufactured by Kawasaki Heavy Industries." 
(emphasis in original). This was not all: "Jet Ski. .. can also refer to versions of 
PWCs with pivoting handlepoles known as 'stand-ups."' 
In fact, the entry went on to say that '"Jet Ski' became foremost the 
colloquial term for stand-up personal watercraft, .... " (emphasis added). There 
was even a table at the back showing that the Jet Ski trademark was generic for 
"Stand-up personal watercraft." It was undisputed that the Honda Aqua Trax was 
a sit-down version of personal watercraft. 
Given the competing definitions, there was no getting around the 
ambiguity of the "jet skis" exclusion. It seemed clear that the coverage question 
could not be "fairly debatable" - and certainly not as a matter of law. 
It seems a rather open question whether legal issues - such as, 
ambiguousness - can be "fairly debatable": 
When making the determination of whether a claim is fairly 
debatable, a judge should remain mindful of an insurer's implied 
duties to diligently investigate claims, evaluate claims fairly, and act 
reasonably and promptly in settling or denying claims. Only when 
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there is a legitimate factual issue as to the validity of the insured's 
claim, such that reasonable minds could not differ as to whether the 
insurer's conduct measured up to the required standard of care, 
should the court grant judgment as a matter of law. 
Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra, at 'fl 12 (internal quotation, 
citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
There was none of that here, or in Jones: 
Normally, the district court's conclusion would be entitled to some 
deference. However, the district court based its ruling largely on the 
legal conclusion that if the plaintiff could not prevail on summary 
judgment, then summary judgment must be granted for the 
defendant .... This case therefore is more like a traditional appeal from 
a grant of summary judgment, which we review for correctness. 
Id., at <JI 13 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
This gets to the heart of the matter because the Court of Appeals elevated 
legal error to the status of a genuine factual dispute: "Finally, we find it very 
persuasive that the district court initially accepted Fire Insurance's theory and 
argument in this case, i.e., in the first round of judicial consideration, not only was 
there a debate, but Fire Insurance actually won the debate." 2016 UT App 54, c_[ 13. 
This cannot be the standard for judging insurer conduct. It is certain that 
reasonable minds can differ on legal issues, but some questions are closer than 
others. There may have been no justification for the trial court's decision. At this 
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point, we would be substituting the quality of the judicial decision for the 
reasonableness of the insurer's conduct. 
An insurance coverage question cannot be "fairly debatable" just because 
the trial court got it wrong in the first instance. Summary judgment is a legal 
question. Therefore, if we accept that legal questions are "fairly debatable," there 
would never be any basis for summary judgment, at least, not on insurance 
coverage matters, so long as there was a question whether the standards for 
summary judgment have been met. 
There was no other justification for the court's ruling. The Court of Appeals 
considered it "very relevant that courts, albeit in somewhat different contexts 
than that presented in this case, have concluded that both 'stand-up' and 
'sit-down' watercraft may be considered jet skis." 2016 UT App 54, at <Jl 13. 
However, neither of the cases helped. 
Ford v. Polaris Industries, Inc., 139 Cal.App.4th 755, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 215 (Cal. 
App. 2006), was a products liability case that did not involve insurance coverage. 
Even so, the California Court of Appeals clarified that the case involved a 
"personal watercraft" and the sport of "jet skiing." Id., at 759 n.3. 
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State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Johnson, 596 So.2d 1162 (Fla. App. 1992) is 
the same case relied upon by Fire Insurance's coverage counsel. To say that it was 
decided "in somewhat different contexts than that presented in this case," 2016 
UT App 54, <j[ 13, is an understatement 
Even counsel admitted that the case was not an exact fit: "The Johnson case 
is slightly different from the present case in that the State Farm policy excluded 
coverage for a 'jet ski or similar type of craft,' while the Fire Insurance Exchange 
policy excludes coverage just for a 'jet ski."' (emphasis added). 
However, this was an absolutely crucial distinction. On this basis, the 
Florida Court of Appeals ruled that the policy provision was unambiguous. 596 
So.2d at 1164. The trial court record showed "that the Yamaha Wave Runner 
[was], at the very least, similar to the Kawasaki Jet Ski." Id. 
There would have been no dispute in this case if Fire Insurance had used 
such language. But counsel hu-ned away from this very important distinction and 
just like the Court of Appeals, 2016 UT App 54, <_II 13, seized on dictum from the 
case: "The term 'jet ski' is often used as a generic term for all personal watercraft 
despite the fact that it is a registered trademark of Kawasaki." 596 So.2d at 1163. 
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This was not the basis for the court's ruling. The court made the comment, 
simply, to address the contention of the trial court that "State Farm should have 
amended its policy to include the term 'personal watercraft' as defined in [Florida 
statute]." Id. The court made clear that the supposedly "generic" definition of Jet 
Ski was an inadequate basis for ruling. 
But none of this saw the light of day. This was because the Court of Appeals 
found further support for Fire Insurance's position in matters that were never 
considered by coverage counsel. 2016 UT 54, <jf 16 n.4. Such as, changes to the 
Wikipedia definition of Jet Ski after counsel's letter. Id., at<_[ 13. 
It should not matter that Wikipedia - today - is 111ore favorable to Fire 
Insurance's interpretation of "jet ski." The "sit-down/stand-up" distinction was 
never very important to Oltmanns's case. Of more in1portance was the fact that Jet 
Ski® is a registered trademark of Kawasaki Heavy Industries, which still appears 
in the Wikipedia entry cited by the Court of Appeals. 2016 UT App 54, <_II 13 n.3. 
We do not believe that legal issues, which are reviewed for simple 
correctness, are proper subjects for the "fairly debatable" standard. Just because 
the trial court got the question wrong does not make the coverage question fairly 
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debatable. Otherwise, there would be no end to what is fairly debatable, and the 
insurer would have effective immunity from any clain1 for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
IL THERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES AS TO WHETHER FIRE 
INSURANCE'S CONDUCT MEASURED UP TO THE REQUIRED 
STANDARD OF CARE. 
A. The coverage opinion was fundamentally flawed. It was based on a case 
that did not support the coverage position. Therefore, Fire Insurance's 
reliance on it was not reasonable. 
In Jones, the insurer took the position that genuine issues prevented 
summary judgment in the insured' s favor, which they probably did. However, 
this did not make the coverage question fairly debatable as a matter of law: 
There is a notable distinction between a factual dispute about the 
validity of the underlying insurance claim and a factual dispute 
about what information the insurance company used to deny the 
claim. Mr. Jones alleges in his case that, based on the information 
Farmers indisputably had, it should have granted his claim or 
conducted further investigation before denying it. There is little 
dispute about what information Farmers used to deny Mr. Jones's 
claim. The disputed facts, therefore, involve the question of whether 
Farmers' conduct n1easured up to the required standard of good faith 
and fair dealing. 
Jones, supra, at <JI 11 (emphasis added). 
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The same is true here. We know, exactly, what information Fire Insurance 
used to deny Oltmanns' claim. It was the coverage opinion of legal counsel. He 
told the insurer there was "a 75% chance of prevailing in a declaratory relief 
action." This - alone - should have given the insurer pause. For, if there was a 
75% chance of prevailing in the declaratory judgment action, there was, at least, a 
25% chance of failing, which (of course) the insurer did. 
Whatever else, we know that the 75% prognosis was most significant in Fire 
Insurance's reasoning of the matter. This was the basis for the decision to refuse 
the tender and file declaratory judgment. However, Fire Insurance then took the 
inexplicable position that the quality of the coverage opinion was "irrelevant" to 
its decision. 
There is no getting around the substance of the opinion unless the Court 
accepts the argument that a coverage opinion - any coverage opinion - no matter 
how flawed, is an absolute bar to claim for breach, which we believe cannot be 
done because the quality of the opinion is inseparable from the insurer's duty: 
An analysis of whether an insurance claim is fairly debatable is 
closely related to an analysis of whether an insurer fulfilled its 
duty ... to evaluate the claim fairly. vVhen making the determination 
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of whether a claim is fairly debatable, a judge should remain mindful 
of an insurer's implied duties to diligently investigate claims, 
evaluate claims fairly, and act reasonably and promptly in settling or 
denying claims. 
Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra, at c_[ 12. 
Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 2006 UT 20, 133 P.3d 428 was cited by 
coverage counsel for the following: "If the policy provision is ambiguous, it will 
be construed in favor of coverage." (R. 565). There is no telling how far counsel 
went with this. It must be assumed that he read the following:" A contract may be 
ambiguous because it is unclear, it omits terms, or the terms used to express the 
intention of the parties may be understood to have two or more plausible 
meanings." Id., at <J[ 15 (internal quotation omitted). 
Of course, there was 1nore to this, which would have been recognized by 
seasoned insurance counsel. (It should be noted that Fire Insurance's coverage 
counsel was counsel for the insurer in Saleh.) Utah courts have been quite explicit 
about the difference between insuring provisions and exclusionary clauses: 
"[P]rovisions that limit or exclude coverage should be strictly construed against 
the insurer." U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1993). 
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Counsel did not have to look very far for this. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 
was cited as being in accord with Saleh: "Sandt' s test for ambiguity is worded 
slightly differently but is functionally equivalent." 2006 UT 20, 1I 17 & n.1. Sandt 
does seem to put a softer spin on the test for ambiguity in insurance cases: "It 
follows that ambiguous or uncertain language in an insurance contract that is 
fairly susceptible to different interpretations should be construed in favor of 
coverage." 854 P.2d at 522-23 (emphasis added). 
Based on these rules of construction, "jet ski" would have to be seen as the 
very definition of ambiguity. Counsel started by noting that "'Jet Ski® is a trade 
name for Kawasaki." The coverage analysis should have stopped there - since the 
watercraft was manufactured by Honda, not by Kawasaki. But counsel went on: 
"The name [Jet Ski], however, has become a genericized trademark for any type of 
personal watercraft." Now, there are two definitions, and here comes a third: "Jet 
Ski. .. can also refer to versions of [personal watercraft] with pivoting handlepoles 
known as 'stand-ups."' 
There can be no denying that Jet Ski was fairly susceptible to different 
interpretations, but this was not the worst of it. A most plausible definition 
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appeared in the Wikipedia entry that was attached to the coverage opinion: '"Jet 
Ski' became foremost the colloquial term for stand-up personal watercraft, 
because in 1973 Kawasaki was responsible for a limited production of stand-up 
models .... " (emphasis added). 11 
This may be why counsel resorted to case law, but even there, uncertainty 
appeared: "Because of the unique language of the Fire Insurance Exchange policy, 
we have not found the exact language .. .in any other cases which have addressed 
the question of what constitutes a 'jet ski' for purposes of an exclusion under a 
homeowners policy." 
We have already examined the case on which counsel relied: State Farm Fire 
& Casualty Co. v. Johnson, supra. It bears repeating that the issue came up later in 
the same court. Thomas v. Prudential Property & Casualty, 673 So.2d 141 (Fla. App. 
1996). Insurers were seen to have changed their policies to avoid the problems 
with Jet Ski. "Watercraft" was found to apply, unambiguously, to all manner of 
personal watercraft exceeding 50 motor horsepower. Id., at 142. 
11 Indeed, there was a table attached to the Wikipedia entry, which was 
part of the original summary judgment motion, showing that Jet Ski was generic 
for "Stand-up personal watercraft." 
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Thus, the hazard of the position Fire Insurance took in this case: 
An objective assessment of the legal landscape evidences that LICOA 
lacked a reasonable basis in law for disputing Pedicini' s claim to 
benefits according to his interpretation of "actual charges." Under 
clearly established Kentucky law, ambiguous contractual terms are 
construed in favor of the insured. The term "actual charges" is 
patently ambiguous; the use of the term in the supplemental policy is 
hopelessly circular, as the tenn "actual charges" even appears within 
its own definition in the policy ... .In light of these facts, LICOA 
should have realized that unilaterally altering its definition of "actual 
charges" was likely to result in legal claims against it by its 
policyholders and that, under Kentucky law, LICOA would lack a 
reasonable basis for denying those policyholders relief .... As a result, 
it is difficult to see how LICOA can maintain that the proper 
resolution of its dispute with Pedicini is fairly debatable as a matter 
of law. 
Pedicini v. Life Ins. Co. of Alabama, 682 F.3d 522, 529 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(internal quotations, citations omitted). 
As we have stated, there would have been no dispute if Fire Insurance had 
used the language "or similar type of craft." The fact that language was missing 
from the "jet skis" exclusion should have made all the difference. Instead, counsel 
relied on dicturn from the florida case in rendering his opinion. Presumably, this 
is why the most he would say is "I believe we have a very strong argument.. .. " 
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Fire Insurance latched on to the statement: "I believe we have a 75% chance 
of prevailing in a declaratory relief action." However, the basis for the calculation 
was never explained. The higher figure may have had to do with counsel's failure 
to note the "strict construction" of insurance policy exclusions. It may have been 
the result of counsel's unsupported assertion that" a reasonable policyholder 
would not see any difference between coverage for a Kawasaki jet ski or any other 
brand of personal watercraft, .... " 
Whatever the basis, the "75% chance" was way overstated. It started with 
the failure to account for the ambiguity that appeared, as a matter of law, on the 
face of the policy exclusion. It was compounded by the failure to note the law of 
"strict construction" that applies to insurance policy exclusions. It ended with 
reliance on a case that actually supported the acceptance of the tender; a case, at 
least, that supported assumption of the insured' s defense. However, none of this 
saw the light of ~ay in the trial court. 
B. To avoid operation of the hearsay rule, the coverage opinion was not 
admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. 
When an insurer relies on the ad vice of counsel, as it did in this case, the 
insurer has put the substance of the counsel at issue. In Utah, this is because the 
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insurer is expected, as part of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
to diligently investigate the facts and fairly evaluate the claim, and then, act 
promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim. See Beck v. Farmers Ins. 
Exchange, supra, at 801. 
There is nothing to suggest that the insurer's duty may be transferred to 
legal counsel. If the insurer chooses to follow the ad vice of counsel, as it did in 
this case, the reasonableness of its conduct becomes synonymous with the quality 
of the counsel. Otherwise, there would be no basis for evaluating the insurer's 
conduct. It would be the same as saying there was no basis for the insurer's 
conduct. 
Admittedly, Fire Insurance has, thus far, succeeded in avoiding 
examination of the coverage opinion: "Fire Insurance did not offer the coverage 
opinion to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the coverage opinion. Rather, 
Fire Insurance offered the coverage opinion to show its effect on the hearer." 12 
Fire Insurance has claimed that the coverage opinion was "relevant only to 
the issue of Fire Insurance's good faith decision to file a declaratory judgment 
12 Brief of Appellee at 27 (Case No. 20140984-CA). 
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action, not the declaratory action's ultimate success or failure. 1113 But there is no 
explanation for how the insurer's "good faith" may be evaluated without 
examining the coverage opinion. 
Fire Insurance was able to convince the trial court to inquire no further than 
the ''75% chance in prevailing in a declaratory relief action," but the trial court did 
not accept the insurer's truth-of-the-matter argument (which was absurd), and 
the trial court knew it, which is why it ruled: "[T]his Court finds that statement is 
based upon the understanding of Shawn Stephen for Fire Insurance, .... " 
But this means that Fire Insurance certified its own good faith. Fire 
Insurance cannot have it both ways. Either, the coverage opinion is irrelevant, 
which is what Fire Insurance has consistently argued; in which case, the trial 
court erred by admitting any part of it. Or, the coverage opinion is perfectly 
relevant for explaining why Fire Insurance did what it did; in which case, the trial 
court erred by refusing to evaluate it. 
Fire Insurance convinced the trial court not to inquire into the substance of 
the admittedly qualified opinion based on Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 2002 
13 Brief of Appellee at 24. 
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UT 68, 56 P.3d 524, and Callioux for Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838 (Utah App. 
1987). For Fire Insurance, it was enough that it had a coverage opinion supporting 
its decision to file for declaratory relief. According to the insurer, the claim was 
"fairly debatable" because its counsel stated "a 75% chance of prevailing in a 
declaratory relief action." It managed to convince the trial court that this was an 
adequate basis for summary judgment. 
The trial court concluded that Fire Insurance satisfied its duty to diligently 
investigate, fairly evaluate, and reasonably refuse the tender of the claim with an 
opinion of legal counsel. The trial court did not inquire about the substance of the 
opinion because to do so would violate the hearsay rule. Therefore, the trial court 
refused to consider the basis for the flawed conclusion that "we have a 75% 
chance of prevailing in a declaratory relief action." There may as well have been 
no basis for the decision. 
C. Counsel never ad vised against assuming defense of the Blackner action. In 
this respect, Fire Insurance was acting, entirely, on its own without cover 
from the legal opinion. 
In light of the foregoing, it is easy to see how Fire Insurance breached its 
duty by failing to assu1ne defense of the Blackner action. Counsel acknowledged 
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the tender of defense that went with the claim. He advised against rejecting the 
claim outright. He advised that the duty to defend was "broader" than the duty to 
indemnify. He, then, acknowledged the request that Oltmanns' counsel continue 
representing him without guarantee of reimbursement. However, nowhere, did 
he advise against assuming the defense. 
What Fire Insurance got was a recommendation to file for declaratory 
judgment. Fire Insurance argued over-and-over in the trial court that it had the 
right to seek declaratory relief. No one contended otherwise. However, it never 
occurred to Fire Insurance that it could argue the coverage question while at the 
same time defending its insured. Fire Insurance has never suggested that it 
satisfied this duty by asking Oltmanns' counsel to continue representing him 
without guarantee of reimbursement. Oltmanns was facing personal liability of 
several hundred thousand dollars. 14 Oltmanns had to spend the next several 
years defending the personal injury action while, at the same time, litigating with 
his insurance company- on his own dime. 
14 Blackner's claim was settled for the policy limit of $300,000.00. 
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Fire Insurance was within its rights to file for declaratory relief. For this, it 
had the advice of counsel. However, in all other respects, it breached its duty. A 
fair evaluation of the claim would have shown that the "jet skis" exclusion was 
unenforceable. A diligent investigation would have shown that the "jet skis" 
exclusion was not even applicable. A reasonable response would have been to 
assume defense of the Blackner action. 
There is no way that Fire Insurance can be seen as having satisfied those 
duties, as a matter of law, by leaving Oltmanns to fend for himself - for three (3) 
long years - against the Blackner action. In this respect, Fire Insurance was acting 
entirely on its own without the cover of legal counsel. Its duties, both contractual 
and implied, were breached by this alone. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REJECTING THE 
RULE 56(f) DECLARATION. 
Oltmanns was taking no chances with summary judgment. Even though he 
thought the motion would fail based on the inferences that should have been 
drawn from the undisputed facts that appeared in the record, he argued that 
genuine issues precluded entry of judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, he 
controverted the two principal statements of fact in Fire Insurance's motion: 
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Paragraph 18: "Fire Insurance began a thorough coverage investigation and 
evaluation regarding the accident in Tuly of 2006 that involved Oltmanns." 
Paragraph 23: "Based on {counsel'sl research regarding the term "iet-ski," {hel 
believed that Fire Insurance had a 75% chance in prevailing in a declaraton, reli~f action." 
Oltmanns controverted <J[18 with Statement of Additional Facts No. 1: 
Before sending the claim for a coverage evaluation, [Fire Insurance] 
determined that it needed "a copy of the vehicle title and registration 
at the time of the accident to determine how the jetski [sic] is 
classified." [Fire Insurance] wanted to know if the vehicle were 
classified as a "watercraft." [Fire Insurance] thought this may "affect 
coverage as per the terms of the insured's policy." [Fire Insurance] 
conceded: "This information is needed before sending out for 
coverage opinion [sic]." However, the vehicle title and registration 
were not secured. Fire Insurance Exchange's Answer to Interrogatory 
No. 1 (Exhibit 1 hereto). It is clear that Utah titles and registers 
"personal watercraft." Utah Code Ann.§ 73-18-2(16); Vessel 
Application for Utah Title (TC-656V). 
At one time, Fire Insurance thought it was important to get a copy of the 
vehicle registration. In fact, Fire Insurance thought the information was necessary 
"before sending out for coverage opinion [sic]." It is easy to see why. If the vehicle 
was registered as a "personal watercraft," as appears above, Subparagraph 7(c) 
would not apply, and the coverage position would fold. 
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This is what remained of Fire Insurance's factual investigation, but it was 
never completed. Fire Insurance claimed in an after-the-fact explanation that the 
information may be "helpful," but was not "critical." Basically, Fire Insurance 
blamed the failure to secure the vehicle registration on coverage counsel: "If 
coverage counsel felt the information was essential for a coverage opinion, 
additional efforts to obtain said information would have been made." 
Despite what Fire Insurance said when discussing the matter internally, the 
trial court deemed the vehicle registration to be of no significance. Therefore, 118 
was declared to be "undisputed." However, the failure to secure the vehicle 
registration went to the heart of Fire Insurance's contention that its coverage 
investigation followed company policy. Statement of Additional Facts No. 1 
shows this was not true. 
Oltmanns controverted <JI23 with Statement of Additional Facts No. 2: 
Though it does not appear in the Statement of Undisputed Facts, 
[Fire Insurance] argues, throughout its motion, that counsel rendered 
a "thorough coverage opinion." (See N1emorandum in Support, pg. 
12). However, no facts have been stated that would support this 
conclusion: i.e., what is a "thorough coverage opinion." This is, 
absolutely, fatal to [Fire Insurance's] motion. Based on the vague and 
conclusory nature of counsel's coverage letter, the following 
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inferences must be drawn, which point to a less than "thorough 
• • II 
coverage op1mon : 
• Counsel's opinion was based on dictum, not on the actual ruling of 
the Florida case. 
• Counsel did not credit that the supposedly "generic" definition of 
jet ski was an inadequate basis for ruling in the Florida case. 
• Counsel did not credit that what made the policy exclusion 
"unambiguous" was the addition of the language: "jet ski or 
similar type of craft." 
• Counsel did not consider what the absence of that language, in 
this case, meant to the construction of the policy exclusion. 
• At least, counsel attached undue significance to the dictum from 
the Florida case; and did not give sufficient weight to the 
difference in the policies considered in light of the Utah standard 
of strict construction of insurance policy exclusions. 
• Counsel did not consider how his resort to extrinsic evidence 
(Wikipedia search) suggested that jet ski was susceptible to 
different interpretations. 
• Counsel gave no heed to the "watercraft" exclusion in the policy, 
which suggested a narrower construction of jet skis. 
These inferences were identified by Oltmanns and presented to the trial 
court both in response to the Motion for Summary Judgment and in a 
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plainly-labeled UTAH R. Crv. PROC. 56(F) declaration. Fire Insurance moved to 
strike the declaration. 
In response, Oltmanns cited LISA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2010 UT 31,235 
P.3d 749: "Even if the moving party's objective statement of the facts are agreed 
upon, reasonable inferences made from those undisputed facts can indeed create 
a genuine issue of material fact. That the objective facts are undisputed does not 
mean that no genuine issues remain as to those facts." Id., at <j{ 32 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
The trial court ruled that the motion was "moot." However, the questions 
raised by Oltmanns show that the "75% chance of prevailing" was overstated. 
There was a failure to account for the ambiguity that appeared, as a matter of law, 
on the face of the policy exclusion. This was compounded by the failure of 
counsel to note the law of "strict construction" that applies to insurance policy 
exclusions. It ended with counsel's reliance on a case that actually supported the 
acceptance of the tender; at least, a case that supported assumption of the 
insured' s defense. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals (2016 UT 
App 54) affirming the Order Granting Fire Insurance Exchange' s Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 863) (Addendum 3 hereto), should be REVERSED. 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment. 
( c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law .... 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony. The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits .... 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the 
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions 
to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is 
just. 
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2016 UT App 54 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Appellee, 
V. 
ROBERT ALLEN OLTMANNS, 
Appellant. 
Opinion 
No. 20140984-CA 
Filed March 24, 2016 
Second District Court, Farmington Department 
The Honorable Glen R. Dawson 
No. 090700825 
Donald L. Dalton, Attorney for Appellant 
Stewart B. Harman and Joel D. Taylor, Attorneys 
for A ppellee 
JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES 
J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN concurred. 
ORME, Judge: 
<J[l Appellant Robert Allen Oltmanns returns to this court, 
once again appealing a district court decision granting summary 
judgment to Fire Insurance Exchange. The core dispute between 
these two parties previously came to this court and was resolved 
in Fire Insurance Exchange v. Oltmanns, 2012 UT App 230, 285 
P.3d 802. Last time we reversed; this time, we affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
~12 This suit grew out of an accident m 2006 involving a 
personal watercraft piloted by Oltmanns, which resulted in the 
injury of Oltmanns' s brother-in-law. Concerned early on about 
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Fire Insurance Exchange v. Oltmanns 
potential tort liability stemming from the accident, Oltmanns 
consulted with a Fire Insurance agent, who offered to assist 
Oltmanns in filing a claim even though the agent was not certain 
there would be coverage.• At that time, Oltmanns declined the 
agent's offer of assistance in submitting the claim. 
':1[3 A year later, the brother-in-law sued Oltmanns for 
negligence and won, obtaining a judgment against him. 
Oltmanns again contacted Fire Insurance. This time, however, 
Oltmanns demanded that Fire Insurance pay the full amount of 
his liability to his brother-in-law under his homeowner' s 
insurance policy. After extensive in-house review, Fire Insurance 
submitted Oltmanns's claim to outside counsel for a coverage 
opm10n. It also told Oltmanns's attorney to continue 
representing Oltmanns and informed him that Fire Insurance 
might reimburse him for his fees and expenses. 
114 Soon thereafter, in a quite thorough coverage opm1on, 
outside counsel expressed the view that the term "jet ski" as 
used in Oltmanns' s policy most likely would be construed as 
referring to the broad category of motorized personal watercraft 
such that, in counsel's opinion, "Fire Insurance had a 75% chance 
of prevailing in a declaratory relief action." Counsel advised 
filing such an action to receive a definitive ruling on the 
coverage question, and Fire Insurance then filed this declaratory 
judgment action seeking a determination of its responsibility to 
Oltmanns under his policy. 
<_[5 Shortly after filing its action, Fire Insurance moved for 
summary judgment, and the district court, agreeing with outside 
counsel's interpretation, ruled in favor of Fire Insurance. 
1. Oltmanns' s policy with Fire Insurance excluded coverage for 
accidents involving the use of "jet skis." In the prior appeal, we 
concluded that this term was ambiguous. See Fire Insurance 
Exchange v. Oltmanns, 2012 UT App 230, 1110, 285 P.3d 802. 
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Fire Insurance Exchange v. Oltmanns 
Oltmanns appealed, and we reversed, concluding that although 
one definition of the term "jet ski" supported the view taken by 
Fire Insurance and the district court, the term was ambiguous 
because "jet ski" was subject to several different interpretations, 
some of which favored Oltmanns. Oltmanns, 2012 UT App 230, 
<Jl<Jl 9-10. Construing the contract against the drafter and in favor 
of the policyholder, we ruled in favor of Oltmanns and 
remanded the case to the district court. Id. <J[ 11. 
1[ 6 Fire Insurance did not petition for rehearing, did not 
petition for certiorari review, and did not try to develop new 
arguments for the district court's consideration on remand. On 
the contrary, it promptly settled with Oltmanns and agreed to 
reimburse him for the attorney fees incurred in defending the 
tort case. Fire Insurance declined, however, to cover Oltmanns' s 
attorney fees related to the coverage dispute, including those 
related to the successful appeal from the district court's grant of 
summary judgment to Fire Insurance. 
117 In an effort to recover those attorney fees, Oltmanns filed 
a counterclaim against Fire Insurance in the still-open 
declaratory judgment action, claiming breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing for Fire Insurance's 
alleged failure to "fairly evaluate" the claim pending against 
Oltmanns and for "unreasonably reject[ing]" that claim. 2 The 
parties began discovery on the issues presented by the 
counterclaim in the fall of 2013. 
2. Unlike some insurance policies that apparently allow for the 
recovery of attorney fees from the insurer by the insured 
following a successful coverage action, both sides indicated 
during oral argument that the insurance contract in this case has 
no such provision. Therefore, the parties agree, Oltmanns is 
entitled to recover his attorney fees only if he can prove bad 
faith-or at least a lack of good faith-by Fire Insurance. 
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Fire Insurance Exchange v. Oltmanns 
18 Almost a year later, Fire Insurance moved for summary 
judgment, relying on the coverage opinion letter and the 
affidavit of the claims specialist who investigated Oltmanns' s 
insurance claim. Despite Oltmanns' s opposition to the motion, 
the district court determined that Fire Insurance's denial of the 
claim was reasonable because the interpretation issue was fairly 
debatable. The court granted summary judgment to Fire 
Insurance. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
19 Oltmanns contends that Fire Insurance was not entitled to 
summary judgment because the interpretation question was not 
"fairly debatable" as a matter of law. Whether denial of a claim 
was "fairly debatable under the facts ... is a question of law that 
we review for correctness." Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 
UT 68, <JI 33, 56 P .3d 524. Although on summary judgment we 
ordinarily "accord no deference to the district court's 
conclusions of law, including its interpretation of precedent and 
statute," Torian v. Craig, 2012 UT 63, <J[ 13, 289 P.3d 479, given the 
highly fact-intensive inquiry typically necessary to make a 
"fairly debatable" determination, "trial courts have 'some 
discretion'" and "we will therefore 'grant the trial court's 
conclusion some deference'" when the pivotal question is fact 
sensitive, Prince, 2002 UT 68, 1I 33 ( quoting Billings v. Union 
Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996)). Here, it is not, see 
infra 1[ 12, and so we review the district court's ruling for 
correctness, according it no deference. 
ANALYSIS 
1[10 Oltmanns challenges Fire Insurance's decision to obtain a 
coverage determination through its declaratory judgment action, 
claiming that Fire Insurance's decision to do so was in bad 
faith, breaching the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
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Fire Insurance Exchange v. Oltmanns 
Fire Insurance, for its part, defends its actions as reasona~le 
under the "fairly debatable" standard. The district court agreed 
with Fire Insurance and granted summary judgment in its favor. 
1111 "[D]enial of a claim is reasonable if the insured' s claim is 
fairly debatable." Prince, 2002 UT 68, <j[ 28. This is because "if an 
insurer denies an 'insured's claim [that] is fairly debatable, [then] 
the insurer is entitled to debate it and cannot be held to have 
breached the implied covenant [ of good faith and fair dealing] if 
it chooses to do so."' Id. (quoting Morris v. Health Net of Cal., Inc., 
1999 UT 95, en 7, 988 P.2d 940) (first and second alterations in 
original) (additional internal quotation marks omitted). The 
district court's prior ruling validating Fire Insurance's 
interpretation of the policy surely seems to make it difficult to 
argue that Fire Insurance's position was not at least "fairly 
debatable." 
1{12 In some respects, the instant case is not unlike previous 
"fairly debatable" cases in that reasonable minds could-and 
did-differ as to their interpretation of key points. See id. <jrI[ 35-
36; Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 842 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). See also Morris v. Health Net of Cal., Inc., 1999 UT 95, 
1[ 7, 988 P.2d 940 ("[U]nder Utah law, 'when an insured' s claim is 
fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to debate it[.]"') (quoting 
Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1996)). 
Unlike those cases, however, here the facts are not in dispute 
and never have been; instead, this case concerns a purely legal 
issue, i.e., whether the term "jet ski" as used in Oltmanns's 
insurance policy was ambiguous as a matter of law. In the first 
appeal, we concluded that the term was ambiguous, and 
resolved the ambiguity against the insurer. See Oltmanns, 2012 
UT App 230, 1l1I 10-11. See also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. 
v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1993) ("[P]rovisions that limit 
or exclude coverage should be strictly construed against 
the insurer."). 
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Fire Insurance Exchange v. Oltmanns 
cil13 This conclusion does not, however, compel the 
determination that the meaning of the clause in question was not 
"fairly debatable." On the contrary, considering the totality of 
the circumstances, it is very relevant that courts, albeit in 
somewhat different contexts than that presented in this case, 
have concluded that both "stand-up" and "sit-down" watercraft 
may be considered jet skis. See, e.g., Ford v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 43 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 215, 217-18 (Ct. App. 2006) (referring to a two-
seater personal watercraft as a "jet ski"); State Farm Fire 
& Casualty Co. v. Johnson, 596 So. 2d 1162, 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1992) (per curiam) ("The term 'jet ski' is often used as 
a generic term for all personal watercraft despite the fact that it 
is a registered trademark of Kawasaki."). It is additionally 
relevant that Wikipedia, the key source for our conclusion in 
Oltmanns as to the colloquial understanding of the term "jet ski," 
now features no less than four different definitions of the 
term, one of which supports Oltmanns' s position and one of 
which supports that of Fire Insurance. See Jet Ski, Wikipedia, 
h ttps://en. wikipedia .org/wiki/J et_Ski [https://perma.cc/ZSN9-
M2CG] (last visited Feb. 17, 2016). 3 Finally, we find it very 
3. The Wikipedia entry, as presently constituted, actually 
furnishes stronger support for Fire Insurance's position than it 
previously did, because the "sit-down" and "stand-up" 
distinction we relied upon in seeing ambiguity has since been 
deleted. Compare Fire Insurance Exchange v. Oltmanns, 2012 UT 
App 230, <j{ 9, 285 P.3d 802 ("The term 'Jet Ski' ... is often mis-
applied to all personal watercraft with pivoting handlepoles 
manipulated by a standing rider; these are properly known as 
Stand-up [Personal Watercraft]."), with Jet Ski, Wikipedia, 
https://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/J et_Ski [https://perma.cc/ZSN9-
M2CG] (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) ("Jet Ski is the brand name of a 
personal watercraft manufactured by Kawasaki. ... The term is 
sometimes used to refer to any type of personal watercraft .... 
Though the proper noun 'Jet Ski' is a registered trademark of 
(continued ... ) 
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Fire Insurance Exchange v. Oltmanns 
persuasive that the district court initially accepted Fire 
Insurance's theory and argument in this case, i.e., in the first 
round of judicial consideration, not only was there a debate, but 
Fire Insurance actually won the debate. 
1{14 As a further note, although it is true that we ultimately 
accepted the definition argued for by Oltmanns in Fire Insurance 
Exchange v. Oltmanns, 2012 UT App 230, 285 P.3d 802, we did so 
only after applying the interpretative rule that ambiguous 
exclusions are to be construed against the insurer. Id. <JI 6. 
Moreover, we applied that rule even though application of the 
rule, in these precise terms, was not Oltmanns' s primary theory 
in the original appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
<JllS An insurance company may reasonably and fairly rely, at 
least initially, upon a coverage opinion from qualified outside 
counsel, received in the course of careful investigation and 
evaluation of a claim. Moreover, submitting the issue to a court 
for interpretation in a declaratory judgment action is a prudent, 
reasonable step toward the resolution of a legitimate dispute 
( ... continued) 
Kawasaki, the common noun 'jet ski' refers to small recreational 
watercraft."). It is, of course, difficult to discern whether the 
change came about in response to our prior opinion, perhaps at 
the instance of someone with a stake in the debate. See generally 
Oltmanns, 2012 UT App 230, 11 18 n.3 (Voros, J., concurring) 
("Among its shortcomings-and strengths-is Wikipedia's 
fluidity. Anyone can edit a Wikipedia entry at any time, making 
it vulnerable to opportunistic editing. Thus, an unscrupulous 
lawyer (or client) could edit the Web site entry to frame the facts 
in a light favorable to the client's cause.") (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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Fire Insurance Exchange v. Oltmanns 
over a coverage term or exclusion. And when an insurance 
company proceeds in a reasonable way to resolve a difficult 
coverage question, its eventual loss at the appellate level does 
not foreclose a determination that an issue of interpretation was 
fairly debatable, as was the case here. 
<]{16 Affirmed. 4 
4. Oltmanns also challenges the district court's denial of a 
motion he filed under former rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Because we conclude that Fire Insurance's 
interpretation of the term "jet ski" as used in Oltmanns' s 
insurance policy was "fairly debatable" as a matter of law, supra 
'IlciI 11-13, we decline to consider this issue. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Plaintiff: 
v. 
ROBERT ALLEN OLTMANNS, BRADY 
BLACKNER, 
Defendants. 
' ORDER GRANTING FIRE INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 090700825 
Honorable Glen R. Dawson 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, Fire Insurance Exchange's ("Fire Insurance" or 
"Plaintiff'), motion for summary judgment duly came before this Court for hearing on 
September 24, 2014, at I :30 p.m. Fire Insurance Exchange appeared through its counsel, Joel D. 
Taylor. Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff, Robert Allen Oltmanns ("Oltmanns" or 
"Defendant''). ,1ppeared through his attorney. Donald L. Dalton. Prior to the hearing the parties 
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submitted memoranda which were reviewed by the Court, and the Court heard oral arguments 
from each of the parties. 
In response to the motion, Oltmanns filed a memorandum in opposition asserting that 
genuine issues existed as to certain material facts. The memorandum was supported by a 
declaration by Oltmanns' counsel tmder Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(e) and (f). However, the Court 
was not persuaded by Oltmanns' opposition. Therefore, the Court, being fully advised, 
concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment. The 
Court further concJudes that the following materiaJ facts are undisputed: 
l. This action concerns a policy of homeowners insurance issued by Plaintiff to Defendant 
Oltmanns. 
2. Oltmanns was sued by Brady Blackner for injuries he sustained while Oltmanns was 
operating a Honda F-12 AquaTrax personal watercraft in Case No. 070700309. 
3. In September 2006, Oltmanns went to his insurance agent, Sherrie Eichmeier, to inquire 
about his homeowners insurance policy. 
4. In September 2006, Oltmanns and Sherrie Eichmeier read the exclusions in Oltmanns' 
homeowners insurance policy. Both Oltmanns and Sherrie Eichmeier thought that 
Oltmanns' accident that occurred on July I I, 2006, was probably not covered due to the 
language contained in the exclusion regarding "jet skis.' 
5. Sherrie Eichmeier told Oltmanns the only way to determine if coverage was provided 
2 
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under his homeowners policy for his July ) 1, 2006, accident was to submit a formal 
claim on his homeowners insurance policy so that an investigation could be conducted. 
6. Sherrie Eichmeier offered to assist Oltmanns in making a formal claim on his 
homeowners insurance policy so that a formal investigation could be conducted on 
Oltmanns' July 11, 2006 accident, to see if coverage was available. 
7. Robert Oltmanns declined Sherrie Eichmeier's offer to assist him in making a formal 
claim on his homeowners insurance policy for the July 11, 2006 accident. 
8. In September 2006, Robert Oltmanns decided he did not want to make a claim on his 
homeO\-vners insurance policy to see if coverage was provided for his July 11, 2006, wave 
runner accident. 
9. Robert Oltmanns never asked Sherrie Eichmeier to assist him in making a formal claim 
on his homeowners insurance policy in September 2006 to determine if his July 11, 2006, 
wave runner accident was covered under his homeowners insurance policy. 
l 0. Oltmanns alleges that during this interaction with Sherrie Eichmeier in 2006 that he 
tendered a claim on his homeowners policy for his accident on July 11, 2006. Oltmanns 
alleges that Fire 1 nsurance denied this claim. 
1). The Blackner lawsuit was filed against Oltmanns the following year in June 2007. 
12. On August 26. 2009~ Oltmanns tendered defense of Blackner v. Caserio, Case No. 
070700309, Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of Utah, to Fire 
3 
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Insurance. 
13. Oltmanns in his Sf!cond Amended Counterclaim alleges, for the first time, the claim was 
"re-tendered" to Fire Insurance on August 26, 2009. 
14. The next day on August 27, 2009, Shawn Stephens, Litigation Claims Specialist for Fire 
Insurance, contacted Oltmanns~ counsel, Don Dalton, to discuss the language of 
Oltmanns~ homeowners insurance policy. 
15. Shawn Stephens told Mr. Dalton that if Oltmanns was seeking coverage for the accident 
that occurred on July 11, 2006, that Fire Insurance would complete a thorough 
investigation of the loss and how coverage would potentially apply. 
I 6. Shawn Stephens specifically told Don Dalton that his email on August 27, 2009, was not 
to be misconstrued as a denial of any kind, regarding Oltmanns' accident. 
17. In response to Shawn Stephens' August 27, 2009 email, Mr. Dalton informed Fire 
Insurance that Oltmanns was making a claim on his homeowners insurance policy. 
18. Starting the next day on August 28, 2009, Fire Insurance began a coverage investigation 
and evaluation regarding the accident in July of 2006 that involved Oltmanns. Shawn 
Stephens. in conducting the investigation and evaluation, requested and received the 
summons and complaint filed against Oltmanns (Case No. 070700309), the cross-claim 
against Oltmanns from the rental companies, a copy of the rental agreement for the 
personal watercraft, and the deposition transcript of Robert Oltmanns regarding the 
4 
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accident in Case No. 070700309. Initially, Fire Insurance stated that it "began a 
thorough coverage investigation." Oltmanns objected that the statement was nothing but 
a conclusion that was not supported by the facts. Oltmanns, also, referred to his 
Statement of Additional Fact No. l (below). In response, Fire Insurance withdrew the 
word "thorough.~' Given the foregoing regarding the use of the word 'thorough' this 
Court concludes that Oltmanns' denial creates no genuine issue of material fact which 
would preclude summary judgment. Therefore, this fact is undisputed. 
19. It took several weeks for Fire Insurance to obtain the necessary documents needed to 
complete a coverage investigation and evaluation. 
20. Fire Insurance held a meeting in the claims litigation department, which included 
supervisors, about Oltmanns' claim and demand for coverage. As a result of the meeting, 
Fire Insurance decided to send the matter to outside counsel for a coverage opinion. 
21. On November 20, 2009. Fire Insurance sent a copy of their file to attorney Alma Nelson 
for a coverage opinion as to whether the July 2006 accident was a covered occurrence 
under Robert Oltmanns· policy. The documents Fire Insurance sent to Mr. Nelson for his 
coverage opinion included: the summons and complaint against Robert Oltmanns in case 
no. 070700309: the filed answers to the complaint for case no. 070700309; a copy of the 
rental agreement for the personal watercraft; Robert Oltmanns' Deposition transcript in 
case no. 070700309; and correspondence with Mr. Dalton. 
22. Also on November 20, 2009, Fire Insurance sent a letter to Don Dalton to inform him that 
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the matter was sent to outside counsel for a coverage opinion. Fire Insurance asked Mr. 
Dalton to continue defending Robert Oltmanns and told him that in the event coverage 
was extended for the July 2006 accident, Fire Insurance would reimburse him for the 
costs and fees incurred by Robert Oltmanns. 
23. On December 11, 2009, Fire Insurance received the coverage opinion from attorney 
Alma N~lson. Based on Alma Nelson's research regarding the term "jet-ski," Mr. Nelson 
believed that Fire Insurance had a 75% chance in prevailing in a declaratory relief action. 
In his coverage opinion, Mr. Nelson sought authorization to file a declaratory relief 
action. Oltmanns objected that the statement, based on Mr. Nelson's letter, was 
inadmissible, conclusory, hearsay since there was no explanation for the "75%" coverage 
evaluation. See Statement of Additional Fact No. 2. Fire Insurance responded that the 
statement was not offered for "the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. Evid. 80l(c)(2). 
However, this Court finds that statement is based upon the understanding of Shawn 
Stephens for Fire Insurance. as set forth in his affidavit. The Court concludes that the 
statement of fact is not hearsay because receiving the coverage opinion from coverage 
counsel. Attorney Alma Nelson, was part of the process of investigating the facts of the 
accident and fairly evaluating the claim. Thus, Oltmanns' response creates no genuine 
issue of material fact. As a result. this Court concludes that this statement of fact is 
undisputed. 
24. On December l 4, 2009. Fire I nsurancc authorized attorney Alma Nelson to file the 
declaratory relief action. 
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25. The declaratory relief aclion was tiled on December 18, 2009. 
26. Robert Oltmanns' homeowners insurance policy which is at issue in this matter does not 
provide attorney's foes for Oltmanns for representation against Fire Insurance when Fire 
Insurance files a declaratory relief action. 
27. Oltmanns seeks damages for alleged breach of contract and the alleged breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Specifically, Oltmanns alleges "Plaintiff 
did not fairly evaluate the claim, and unreasonably rejected it, in violation of Utah law, 
thus breaching the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." In addition, 
Oltmanns alleges he is entitled to attorney's fees and damages for 44Severe emotional 
distress caused by the coverage denial. ... " 
28. Oltmanns never sought nor received any medical treatment for his alleged severe 
emotional distress. Oltmanns ol~jectecl that the statement was irrelevant because 
Defendant OLTMANNS has made no claim (in tort) for ·emotional distress.' Rather, 
Defendant OLTMANNS' claim is for consequential damages, in this case, attorney's fees 
and 'mental anguish,· resulting from breach of the insurance contract and the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This Court, however, concludes that Oltmanns' 
response to this statement of fact creates no genuine issue of material fact which would 
precluck the granting of summary judgment. 
29. After the Court or Appeals remanded this case to the district court, Fire Insurance settled 
the underlying claims against Defendant Oltmanns. The Blackner lawsuit was dismissed. 
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(October 30.2012). Oltmanns' objected that this statement of fact is immaterial. This 
Court. however. concludes that Oltmanns' response to this statement creates no genuine 
issue of material fact which would preclude the granting of summary judgment. In 
addition. this Court concludes that this statement of fact is material, in that it shows Fire 
Insurance continually acted in good faith throughout the legal process. It further shows 
that Fire Insurance acted promptly and reasonably in settling the claim against Oltmanns. 
30. Fire Insurance paid Oltmanns for his costs and attorney's fees incurred in the defense of 
the Blackner case. Oltmanns' objected that this statement of fact is immaterial. This 
Cou11, however. concludes that Oltmanns' response to this statement creates no genuine 
issue of material fact which would preclude the granting of summary judgment. In 
addition, this Court concludes that this statement of fact is material, in that it shows Fire 
Insurance contimm lly acted in good faith throughout the legal process and in showing 
that Fire Insurance acted promptly and reasonably in settling the claim against Oltmanns. 
31. This Court is the trier of fact in this matter. 
32. Oltmanns made the following statement of additional fact (No. 1), which was based on 
Fire Insurance's response to Oltmanns' interrogatories: "Before sending the claim for a 
coverage evaluation, Plain ti ff determined that it needed a copy of the vehicle title and 
registration at the time of the accident to determine how the jetski [sic] is classified. 
Plaintiff wanted to know i r the vehicle were classified as a 'watercraft.' Plaintiff thought 
this may affect coverage as per the terms of the insured's policy. Plaintiff conceded: This 
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information is needed before sending out for coverage opinion [sic]. However, the 
vehicle title and registration were not secured. It is clear that Utah titles and registers 
'personal watercraft.' Utah Code Ann. § 73-18-2( 16); Vessel Application for Utah Title 
(TC-656 V)." (internal quotations omitted). Fire Insurance objected on the same basis that 
it objected to the interrogatories. At the same time, Fire Insurance repeated the complete 
answer it gave to the interrogatories: '"Fire Insurance Exchange did not need said 
information prior to sending the matter out for a coverage opinion. However, said 
information may have assisted coverage counsel in understanding how the Honda F-12 
personal watercraft was classified. In addition, the registration may have provided 
technical language. including to whom the watercraft was registered to. Fire Insurance 
Exchange sought to provide coverage counsel with as much information as possible 
within the time constraints. It was determined that the identified information would be 
helpful, but it was not felt to be critical. If coverage counsel felt the information was 
essential for a coverage opinion. additional efforts to obtain said information would have 
been made.~' The Court concludes that this additional fact, along with the response from 
Fire lnsmam:c that if coverage counsel felt the information to be necessary for the 
coverage opinion that additional efforts to obtain the information would have been made, 
creates no genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. As a result, this 
fact is undisputed in Fire Insurance's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Given the foregoing undisputed material facts, this Court concludes that Fire Insurance, 
in relation to the claim made by Brady Blackner against Robert Oltmanns, diligently investigated 
C) 
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the facts to determine if the claim was valid. Fire Insurance fairly evaluated the claim. 
Thereafter. Fire Insurance, acted promptly and reasonably by first filing a declaratory relief 
action and ultimately settling the claim against Robert Oltmanns on his behalf. This Court 
concludes that Fire Insurance was faced with a fairly debatable question surrounding the 
coverage of Brady B lackners' claims against Robert Oltmanns. Specifically, this Court 
concludes the definition of 'jct skis' as found in Oltmanns' homeowners insurance policy 
presented a fairly debatable claim. Thus, this Court concludes Fire Insurance was entitled to 
seek a declaratory judgment as to its obligations to Oltmanns and its duties under the insurance 
contract. Therefi.we, for the foregoing reasons this Court concludes that Fire Insurance did not 
breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to Oltmanns. Further, this Court 
concludes that Fire Insurance did not breach the insurance contract with Oltmanns. Just the 
opposite, this Court concludes that Fire Insurance continually acted in good faith and performed 
its duties under the homeowners insurance contract with Oltmanns. It is therefore, 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Fire Insurance's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Oltmanns' claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and Oltmanns' 
claim of breach of contract is GRANTED. Accordingly, Oltmanns' causes of action for breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breach of contract as found in the 
Second Amended Counterclaim arc DISMISSED with prejudice. Fire Insurance's motion to 
strike the declaration of Oltmanns' counsel is denied as moot. At the hearing, Fire Insurance 
withdrew its motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations (Utah Code Ann. § 31A2 l-
313). The Court allowed the motion to dismiss to be withdrawn without prejudice. This 
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ORDER granting summary judgment in favor of Fire Insurance disposes of all claims against 
Fire Insurance in this action and is the final order. 
*********** ** ****** * ***** ******END OF ORDER***************************** 
Signature of COURT at the top. 
Approved as to Form: 
DALTON & KELLEY, PLC 
I sf Donald L. Dalton I 
Donald L. Dalto11 
Attorney for Robert Allen Oltmanns 
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DONALD L. DALTON-4305 
DALTON & KELLEY, PLC 
Attorneys for Counterclaim Plaintiff 
Post Office Box 58084 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158 
Telephone: (80 I) 583-2510 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
ROBERT ALLEN OLTMANNS, BRADY 
BLACKNER, 
Defendants. 
DECLARATION OF DONALD L. 
DALTON (RULE 56(t)) 
Case No. 090700825 
Honorable Glen R. Dawson 
DONALD L. DALTON, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-705, declares as follows: 
1. As appears from Fire Insurance Exchange's Motion for Summary Judgment, it relied on 
the advice of counsel in refusing the tender of defense of the claim against Defendant 
OLTMANNS. 
2. The advice appears in a letter of counsel dated December 11, 2009 (Exhibit J). The letter 
is referenced in the Affidavit of Shawn L. Stephens (Exhibit D, ~ 14). However, there is 
no affidavit of counsel, and he has not been deposed. 
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3. What appears to have been most significant to Plaintiff was counsel's statement of "a 
75% chance of prevailing in a declaratory judgment action." (Exhibit J, pg. 8). However, 
there is no explanation how counsel came to this determination. 
4. It appears to have been based on State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Johnson, 596 So.2d 
1162 (Fla. App. 1992). However, it appears to have been based on dictum from the case. 
5. Specifically, it appears to have been based on the Florida court's observation that "[t]he 
tenn 'jet ski' is often used as a generic term for all personal watercraft despite the fact 
that it is a registered trademark of Kawasaki." 596 So.2d at 1163. However, this was not 
the basis for the court's ruling. 
6. Rather, the mling was based on the unambiguous policy exclusion ("jet ski or similar 
type of craft." 596 So.2d at 1164. The ruling was also based on the trial record that 
showed "the Yamaha Wave Runner [was], at the very least, similar to the Kawasaki Jet 
Ski." Id. 
7. Given the circumstances of the case, it appears quite clear that the supposedly "generic" 
nature of jet ski was an inadequate basis for ruling in that case. 
8. Based on this, I would ask counsel how he reconciled the Florida court rnling - rather 
than its dictum - with the coverage determination. 
9. I would also ask whether, and if so, to what extent, he factored in the Utah rule of strict 
construction of insurance policy exclusions. 
l 0. I would ask counsel if he considered whether his resort to extrinsic evidence (Wikipcdia 
search) suggested that jet skis was susceptible to different interpretations. 
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11. I would also ask if he considered whether the "watercraft" exclusion in the policy 
suggested a narrower interpretation of jet skis. 
12. It was not possible to depose counsel, in response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment because of the expiration of the discovery cut-off. See Amended Scheduling 
Order, ~I (March 5, 2014). See also Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(1). 
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed on this 13th day of June, 2014. 
Isl Donald L. Dalton 
DONALD L. DAL TON 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THIS WILL CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing, 
"Declaration of Donald L. Dalton (Rule 56(f))," to bee-filed this 13th day of June, 2014, with 
service to: 
Scott W. Christensen 
Joel D. Taylor 
Plant, Christensen & Kanell, P.C. 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Isl Donald L. Dalton 
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AARON ALMA NCLSOtl 
BRUCE. C, BURT" 
MICHACL D. LICHFIElO 
LINDA 1.,W. ROTH 
'ALSO ADMITTEO 
IN WYOMIN0 
NELSON, CHIPMAN & BURT 
A PROF'E:SSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
50 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 950 
SALT LAKC CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELE.PHONE. (BOil 364•3627 
TF:LECOP1£R (13011 364-3756 
December 11, 2009 
Sent To Farmers Document Center and to Personal E-Mnil 
Mr. Shawn L. Stephens 
Field Claims Representative 
. Fire Insurance Exchange 
P.O. Box 268994 
Oklahoma City, OK 73126 
shawn.stejJhens@farmersinsurance.com 
Re: Insured: 
Claim No.: 
Policy No.: 
Date of Loss: 
Claimant: 
Dear Mr. Stephens: 
R & E Oltmanns 
1014609377 
76 0919082163 
07/11/2006 
Brady Blackner 
DON J, H,MISON 
(1918•200,3) 
JOHN M, CHIPMAN 
(RCTIRE'O) 
This letter is in response to your request for our opinion regarding coverage to your insured, 
Robert Oltmanns, for claims made against Mr. Oltmanns by Brady Blaclmcr for injuries sustained 
by Mr. Blackner as a result of an accident involving a Honda F-12 personal watercraft. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
On .July I I, 2006, your insm-ecl, Robert Oltmanns, was operating a Honda F-12 personal 
watercraft, from which he was towing Brady Blackner on a tube. The tube ran into a rock, causing 
injuries to Mr. Blaclmer's foot, thigh and ankle. 
The Honda personal watercraft operated by Mr. Oltmanns at the time of the accident was 
owned by friple R Rentat Inc., and had been rented to Keith Caserio before the accident. Mr. 
Cascrio allowed Robert Oltmaims to operate the personal watercrnfi at the time of the accident. 
Brady Blackner has brought suit against Keith Caserio, Robert Oltmanns and various rental 
companies to recover for his injuries. Mr. Blackner alleges that the accident was caused by 
negligence of Robert Oltmanns in the operation of the Honda penmnal watercraft and by negligence 
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Mr. Shawn L. Stephens 
December l l, 2009 
Page 2 
of Mr Caserio and the rental companies in entrusting the watercraft to a person who was not trained 
or competent to drive the watercraft. He alleges general and special damages, and punitive damages, 
"if the evidences warrant such." 
Both the Complaint and the Answer by Mr. Oltmanns' attorney refer to a date of the accident 
in July of 2003. This appears to be an error, as the rental agreement for the personal watercraft is 
dated July 6, 2006. 
At the time of the accident, Robert Oltmanns was insured t1nder a Protector Plus 
Homeowners package policy, Fourth Edition, with Fire Insurance Exchange, having liability limits 
of $300,000. Mr. Oltmanns apparently advised his insurance agent, Sherrie Eichmeier, of claims 
made against him by Mr. Blackner in Septembe1: of 2006, but the agent told him there was no 
coverage. Mr. Oltmanns' attorney, Donald L. Dalton, then appeared 011 behalf of Mr. Oltmanns in 
the lawsuit filed by Mr. Blackner and has been defending that lawsuit on behalf of lVlr. Oltmanns 
since July of 2007. 
On August 26, 2009, Mr. Dalton sent a letter to agent Sherrie Eicluneier, tendering the 
·defense of Mr. Oltmann in the pending lawsuit to Fire Insurance Exchange, and arguing that 
coverage would apply under the homeowners policy. On September 30, 2009, Kraig Kimber of Fire 
Insurance Exchange sent a letter to Mr. Oltmann with a reservation of rights to deny coverage. On 
November 20, 2009, Shawn Stephens sent a letter to Mr. Oltmanns' attorneys, advising them that 
Fire Insurance Exchange vvas sending the matter to outside counsel for a coverage opinion and 
asking that Mr. Dalton continue to represent Mr. Oltmanns in the lawsuit. Mr. Stephens' letter stated 
that ifcoverage is extended, Fire Insurance Exchange will reimburse Mr. Dalton for reasonable costs 
and expenses for defense or the case from the date Fire Insurance Exchange received the Notice of 
Claim, August 26, 2009, until a coverage decision is made. 
J?OLICY PROVISIONS 
The Farmers Protector Plus homeowners pack.age policy provides liability coverage as 
follows: 
Coverage E - Personal Liability 
We will pay those damages vvhich nn insured becomes legally 
obligated to pay because of bodily injmy ... resulting from an 
occurrence to whi~h this coverage applies ... . 
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December 11, 2009 
Page 3 
At our expense and with attorneys of ow- choice we will defend an 
insured against any covered claim or suit. ... 
The policy contains the following exclusion: 
Applying To Coverage E and F - Personal Liability and Medical 
Pnyments to Others 
We do not cover bodily injury ... which 
7. Results from the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or 
unloading of: 
a. Aircraft 
b. Motor vehicles 
c. jet skis and jet sleds or 
cl. Any other watercraft owned or rented to an 
insured and which: 
(1) Has more than 50 horsepower 
inboard or outboard-outdrive motor 
power; or 
(2) Is powered by one or more 
outboard motors with more than 25 
total horsepower; or 
(3) Is a sailing vessel 26 feet or more 
in length. 
8. Results from the entrustment ofany aircraft, motor vehicles, 
jet skis or jet sleds to any person. Entrustment means the 
permission you give to any person other than you to use any 
personal aircraft, motor vchicles,jet skis or jet sleds owned 
or controlled by you. 
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December 11, 2009 
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9. Results from the cntrustment of watercraft described in 7d 
above. 
Exclusion 7c, clearly excludes coverage for injuries resulting from "ownership, maintenance, 
use, loading or unloading'' of "jet skis and jet sleds." The question is whether the Honda F-12 
personal watercraft operated by 1vlr. Oltmanns at the time of the accident was a Hjet ski" under the 
terms of the policy. We will discuss this issue hereafter. 
Exclusion 7d, which excludes coverage for ownership, maintenance, use, loading or 
unloading of"any other watercraft owned or rented to an insured" would not apply, since the Honda 
personal watercr~(t which was operated by Mr. Oltmanns at the time of the accident was not "owned 
or rented to an insured)) tmder the terms of the policy. It was rented to Keith Caserio, who was not 
an insured under the Fire Insurance Exchange homeowners policy issued to Mr. Oltmanns. · 
Exclusion 8, which excludes coverage for injury which "results from the entrustment of .. 
. jet skis ... to any person" w0t1ld not apply because this exclusion defines "entrustment" as "the 
permission you give to any person other than you to use any ... jet skis ... owned or controlled by 
you.,, The policy defines "you" as the named insmecl and spouse, if a resident of the same 
household. Since the Honda personal watercrnft. operated by Mr. Oltmmms at the time of the 
accident was not owned by Mr. Oltmanns, and Mr. Ollmanns did not give permission to anyone else 
to operate the Honda personal watercraft, the exclusion for entrustment would not apply. 
Exclusion No. 9 also would not apply. Exclusion No. 9 excludes coverage for injury which 
".results from the entrustment of watercraft described in 7d above." The "watercraft" described in 
7d is watercraft owned or rented to an insured. As discussed above, since the Honda personal 
watercraft was not owned or rented to l'v1r. Oltmanns, or any other insured under Mr. Oltmrums' 
policy, this exclusion would not apply. 
Sin~e none of the other exclusions apply, the coverage issue comes down to whether the 
Honda personal watercraft operated by Mr. Oltmanns at the time of the accident was a "jet ski" under 
the terms of the exclusion jn the Fire Insurance Exchange policy. 
BLACKNRR AND OLTMANNS' CLAIMS OF COVERAGE 
The attorneys for Brady Blaclmer and Robert Oltmanns obvio.usly will be arguing that a "jet 
ski,' is a particular brand and type of personal watercraft, and that the exclusion in the Fire Insurance 
Exchange policy should not apply to the Honda F-12 personal watercraft operated by Mr. Oltmanns 
at the time of the accident. 1n foct, the attorney for Mr. Blackner has tried to set this up through 
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Mr. Shawn L. Stephens 
December I 1 , 2009 
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questions asked of Mr. Oltmanns in Mr. Oltmanns' deposition. On page 31 of Mr. Oltmanns' 
deposition, the following testimony appears: 
Q: Okay. let me ask you, at the time of the accident did you 
know what a Jet Ski was? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: Did you have an understanding of how a Jet Ski may differ 
from the term personal watercraft? 
A: No, I did not lmow the difference. 
Q: Do you know the difference now? 
A:No. 
Q: Do you have any memory of what type of personal 
watercraft you were driving? 
A: From what I remember I think it was a Honda. 
Q: Did it say Jet Ski anywhere on it? 
A: I don't remember. 
(Deposition ofRobert Oltmanns, pp. 31:-32.) 
Later in the deposition, Mr. Blaclrner's attorney showed Mr. Oltmanns' pictmes of what he 
called a "Jet Ski," and the following testimony was given: 
Q: Let me represent to you that this is a Jet Ski. Have you 
ever seen this type of personal watercraft when you've been boating 
or out on the lake? 
A: Is this the one where the handle sits up? 
Q: Right. 
A: Yeah I have. 
Q: And have you seen how the riders can stand up on them 
and they operate it by moving the handle up and down? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: Is that different than the personal watercraft that you were 
driving when this accident happened? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And the mode of operation from what you've observed 
from a Jet Ski is very different than the personal watercraft that you 
were riding; is that correct? 
A: Yeah, I would - yeah. 
Q: And you've never operated a Jct Ski: is that correct? 
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A: I have never. 
(Deposition of Robert Oltmanns, pp. 37-38.) 
ANALYSIS OF COVERAGE 
The Fire Insurance Exchange homeowners policy excludes coverage for injuries which result 
from the "ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading" of "jet skis.,, The term '~et skis', in 
the policy is not capitalized. Nevertheless, Mr. Blackner and Mr. Oltmanns will argue that this is 
a brand name, or at least refers to a particular type of personal watercraft in which the handlebars 
raise up and the rider stands while operating the watercraft. l do not believe this claim is supported 
by either the evidence or the case law. 
Under Utah law, a liability insurance carrier,s duty to defend is broader than its duty to 
indemnify. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 
714 P.2d 1143 (Utah 1986). In general, an insurer's duty to defend is determined by comparing the 
allegations of the complaint with the provisions of the insurance policy. Fire Insurance Exchange 
v. Estate of Otto F Therkelsen, Jr., 2001 UT 48; 27 P.3d 555. The Utah Supreme Comt has held, 
however, that where the policy language is the same as the language of the Fire Insurance Exchange 
homeowners policy, the insurer may look beyond the al1egations of the complaint to determine if 
coverage applied under the facts of the case. Fire Insurance Exchange v. Therke/sen, supra; Fire 
insurance Exchange v. Rosenberg, 930 P.2d 1202 (Utah /\pp. 1997). 
Under Utah law, if an insurance policy provision is not ambiguous~ it will be interpreted 
according to its terms. lflhe policy provision is ambiguous, it will be construed in favor of coverage. 
Snleh v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2006 UT 20, 133 P.3d 428. Unless the language of an 
insurance contract is ambiguous or unclem-, the courl must construe it according to its plain and 
ordinary meaning. Miller v. UStlA Casualty Insurance Co., 2002 UT 6, 44 P.3d 663. 
The term "jct ski,, is not defined in U1c Fire Insurance Exchange policy. Therefore, we must 
look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the term and decide if il is ambiguous. 
"Jet Ski®" is a trade name for Kawasaki. The attorney for Mr. Blackner apparently claims 
that the Kawasaki ''.let Ski@', is a stand-up personal watercraft with handlebars that raise up to allow 
the operator to stand. Jn fact, Kawasaki "Jet Ski®" makes both a stand-up model and a sit-down 
model. The sit-down. model is practically identical to the Honda AquaTrnx@ F-12 personal 
watercraft which Mr. Oltmanns was operating at the time of the accident. 'vVc are enclosing 
documents which we obtained from the internet showing both the stand-up model Kawasaki Jet Ski 
and the sit-down model Kawasaki Jet Ski, as well as the Honda /\qua Trax@ F-12 personal 
. ; 
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watercraft. We Googled the term "jet ski," and the first name that crune up was the Honda 
AquaTrax®. A copy of that web search is enclosed. 
We also went to Wikipedia and looked at "jet ski." A copy of the ,u·ticle from Wikipedia is 
enclosed. The article states: 
Jet Ski is the brand name of a personal watercraft (PWC) 
manufactw-ed by Kawasaki Heavy Industries. The name, however, 
has become a genericized trademark for any type of personal 
watercraft. Jet Ski (or JetSki, often shortened to "Ski") can also refer 
to versions of PWCs with pivoting handlepoles known as "stand-
ups." Sit-down PWCs are also called "Jet Skis." 
A general search of com1 cases finds numerous cases in which the com-ts have referred to 
various brands of personal watercraft as "jet skis." For example, in Ford v. Polaris Industries, Inc., 
139 Cal. App. 4111 755, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215 (2006), the court referred to a two-seater Polaris personal 
watercraft as a "jet ski," and to its operator as a "jet skier." In Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC, v. 
Colombo, the United States Comi of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit referred to a Sea-Doo personal 
watercraft as a "jet ski." 
Because of the unique language of the Fire Insurance Exchange policy, we have not found 
the exact language of the Fire Instu"ance Exchange policy in any other cases which have addressed 
the question of what constitutes a "jet ski" for purposes of an exclusion under a homeowners policy. 
A case which is very close to the present case, however, is State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. 
Johnson, 596 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. App. 1992). In that case, Mr. Jolmson was operating a Yamaha 
Wave Runner personal watercraft when he was involved in an accident causing personal injuries. 
Mr. Johnson sought liability coverage under his homeowners policy, but State Farm denied coverage 
based on an exclusion in the State Farm policy for bodily injury or property damage arising out of 
the ownership, maintenance, or use of a-watercraft "designed as m1 air boat, air cushion, jet ski or 
similar type of craft." Mr. Johnson then filed a declaratory relief action, claiming that the Yamaha 
Wave Runner which he was operating at the time of the accident was not a "jet ski or similar type 
of craft_,, Mr. Johnson argued that the Yamaha Wave Runner, unlike the Kawasaki Jet Ski, could 
be operated from a sitting position and was not similar to a Jet Ski. 
At the trial of the declaratory relief action, State Fann presented evidence that Kawasalci 
manufactured both a stand-up and a sit-down model Jet Ski, and that the Jet Ski was virtually 
identical to the Yamaha Wave Runner. Sales brochures for both the Kawasaki Jet Ski and the 
Yamaha Wave Runner were entered into evidence, demonstrating that the two personal watercraft 
were virtually identical. Nevertheless, the trial court held that the Stale Farm policy did not clearly 
exclude coverage for a Wave Rrnmer, and held that coverage applied. 
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.On appeal, the Florida Court of Appeals reversed the trial comt, holding that the Yamaha 
Wave Rmmer was clearly a "jet ski or similar type of craft," and that coverage was clearly excluded 
under the State Farm policy. The court noted that the average person could not differentiate between 
the Kawasaki Jet Ski and the Yamaha Wave Runner. The court further noted that the term "jet ski" 
is often used as a generic term for all personal watercraft, despite the fact that it was a registered 
trademark of Kawasaki. The court held that the policy language was not ambiguous, and that the 
Yamaha Wave Runner was, at the very least, similar to the Kawasaki Jet Ski. 
The Johnson case is slightly different from the present case in that the State Farm policy 
excluded coverage for a "jet ski or similar type of craft,'' while the Fire Insurance Exchange policy 
excludes coverage just for a "jet ski." Nevertheless, since "jet ski" is used generically for all 
watercraft, since the comts have regularly used the term "jet ski,, to refer to various brands of 
watercraft, and since a reasonable policyholder would not see any difference between coverage for 
a Kawasaki jet ski or any other brand of personal watercraft, r believe we have a very strong 
argument that the Fire Insurance Exchange policy excludes coverage for the accident in question. 
Based on the information we now have, I believe we have a 75% chance of prevailing in a 
declaratory relief action. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is obvious from the deposition of Robert Oltmanns that Brady Black.ner's attorney is 
attempting to set up Fire Insurance Exchange for liability on this claim. It would be dangerous to 
simply deny coverage because Mr. Blaclmer and Mr. Oltmanns may enter into an agreement to 
stipulate to a large judgment and Mr. Oltmatrns could then assign his claims against Fire Insurance 
exchange to Mr. Blackner. 
Since we are likely to become involved in litigation anyway, I recommend that you authorize 
me to file a declaratory relief action against Robert Oltmmrns and Brady Blackner, seeking a 
declaration that Fire lnsmance Exchange does not owe coverage for the claims made against Mr. 
Oltmanns. 
If you have any questions, please call me. 
AAN/df 
enclosures 
Very truly yours, 
NELSON, CHIPMAN & BURT 
'/. .· ,,.-;>/ -_y _,.•1_,,.:-' 
,:/:. -.P,£cY. -~--;::--Z,4=<n ,,/c_,.£.e:i.:::r:{t'">-( 
Aaron Alma Nelson 
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